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affix to the theorem a qualification which is far from weak. Conversely, to accept the possibility of the existence of bliss points (satiation consumption bundles3) does not violate conditions for economic "perfection," since the properties of bliss points are not in conflict with assumptions of the lack of externalities, the selfishness of preferences, the perfection of knowledge, or the perfection of rationality.
The concept of consumer satiability not only is of importance in theoretical welfare economics, but also has been used widely by old and new left economists, a few contemporary liberals, and some well-known earlier economists.4 Perhaps the clearest applications of satiability are in the writings of the classical utopians and the speculations of the Marxist theory of pure communism, which postulates uniformly zero prices in an environment devoid of any rationing devices.5 The relevancy of satiability to new left views is illustrated by Michael Zweig's assertion that "marginalism is appropriate as a technique under two fundamental conditions: 1) scarcity; 2) a desire for maximization (or minimization). . . . Who will be the economists helping to undo the artificial rat-race? Who will be the operations-analysts in the hippie communities? Who will analyze a world in which more stuff is not better? In the absence of effective scarcity, marginalism loses its relevance."6 John Kenneth Galbraith's applications of the concept of consumer satiability are widely known,7 as are those of some ecologists.
The Issue
Although all neoclassical welfare proofs and some set-theoretic welfare proofs assume nonsaturation, Arrow has demonstrated the Pareto optimality of competitive equilibria in a private ownership economy through a remarkably simple proof, which is dependent in no way upon insatiability assumptions. 8 Not excluding the possibility of bliss points, Arrow's proof is of particular interest and relevance. The contention of this article is that Arrow's proof is based upon a definition which is valid only when consumers are insatiable. Once this definition has been corrected, Pareto optimality no longer need hold for competitive equilibria.
In 1955 David Gale published an important article, "The Law of Supply and Demand."9 Gale, like Arrow, considered the possibility of bliss points, but Gale also correctly identified the possibility of the existence in equilibrium of what he called "savings" -goods supplied by the economy but never consumed. Since savings generally are viewed as having been motivated by a taste for future consumption, Gale's term might more descriptively have been "savings by default." When referring to Gale's savings, this article generally will use the term hoarding. Gale's view is presented in a deceptively simple example in which he postulates the existence of a pure exchange economy containing two persons, Mr. A and Mr. B, and a quantity, Q, of one good. Mr. A is assumed to own the entire stock, while Mr. B owns nothing. Mr. A is satiable in the one good at a consumption level of P, which is assumed to be less than the total stock, Q; Mr. B is insatiable.
Since the model has one good and no labor, the single good trivially is chosen as the numeraire with a price of one. No other good existing to be sacrificed, and no production existing in the model, free disposal is assumed implicitly. Since the model is one of pure exchange, no need exists to consider the merits of a profit maximization assumption. Mr. A will choose to consume at his saturation level and will dispose of the remainder of the stock, that is, of Q-P. Mr. B having nothing to offer, and Mr. A. wanting nothing more, Mr. B. will have no choice but to consume nothing. This equilibrium allocation is not Pareto optimal: The allocation of P units to Mr. A and Q-P units to Mr. B is a Pareto superior allocation. Clearly Gale's solution to that trivial pure exchange problem is correct.
Gale used his simple example as a means of demonstrating the need for a no savings assumption in his welfare proof rather than to investigate the welfare effects of relaxing that assumption. Although his welfare proof related to a pure exchange model in which income in excess of the satiation level is not permitted in equilibrium, Gale carefully qualified the conclusion of his welfare theorem to apply solely to the single "important special case of a model with no savings."'" Arrow, on the other hand, did permit the existence of equilibrium income in excess of satiation," but without recognizing the complications illustrated by Gale.
Since the meanings of profits, price, and market in Gale's no production, one good, and no exchange example are not clear, extensions of Gale's illustration are required to reveal the impact of satiation on welfare in a market economy. Such extensions will be developed in detail below.
To exhibit the welfare effects of bliss points, a stationary pure exchange economy will be considered. 2 The case of a bliss point in a consumer's preferences is illustrated in Figure 1 , onto which two budget constraints have been superimposed. P is a bliss point surrounded by concentric indifference curves with a larger radius corresponding to a lower level of satisfaction. Although along budget Although this example illustrates that a competitive equilibrium need not be Pareto optimal, Arrow's proof purports to demonstrate that such a result is impossible, even if an attainable bliss point exists. Arrow's proof holds since, by his definition, a competitive equilibrium can exist only if the aggregate value of goods supplied ("profits"), determined through their maximization, is equal to the value of goods consumed. Figure 2 violates that equality condition. One possible source of Arrow's definition is the strong (equality) form of Walras's Law, derived by summing the budget constraints in equality form. But the equality form of the budget constraint itself is a conclusion following from two assumptions: the inequality form of the budget constraint (which is an assumption15), and the insatiability of preferences. Since insatiability is not assumed in Arrow's theorem, consumers need not exhaust their budgets and the strict form of Walras's Law need not apply. 6 Another possible argument exists favoring the equality in equilibrium of the value of goods supplied and of those consumed. It might be argued that the market for a nonfree good is cleared only if the quantity of the good supplied equals the quantity consumed. When satiability is permitted, that view would ignore the fact that equilibrium In the above example, one Pareto optimal equilibrium could be attained: Mr. A could agree to transfer his unconsumed quantity of good X to Mr. B as a gift. The point is that, contrary to Arrow's assertion, such an equilibrium need not be unique. Indeed, the efficient allocation is only one among an uncountably infinite number of inefficient equilibria. In practice a choice between nonunique equilibria can be made only on the basis of the probable direction of deviations from the model's assumptions and on the basis of the model's robustness to such deviations. Since these choices are not relevant to theory, they will be left to later sections on applications.
The Model with Production
To illustrate the effect of bliss on economic welfare when production exists, consider the case of a stationary, two person, one good, one industry (hereafter referred to as the firm) economy; initial stocks of the consumer good do not exist,"7 and the firm is owned through inheritance solely by one of the two persons. The one laborer-manager, viewed as having no initial endowment, exchanges his labor for quantities of the one good at the rate of exchange defined by the wage rate. The owner, on the other hand, views work as severely demeaning to a person in his position-he would rather starve than work. Furthermore, he is assumed to be satiable in the single good, X, at that consumption level indicated by point B in Figure 3 ; his level of satisfaction declines as his consumption level increases or decreases along the Good X axis from his bliss point. 18 In Figure  3 the production function is shown as OT, and several of the laborer-manager's indifference curves have been superimposed upon the first quadrant. The laborer-manager is assumed to be locally insatiable at the wage rates to be considered. Now let the wage rate be represented as the slope of the ray OS in Figure 4 . The laborer-manager will wish to consume at R and to supply L* units of labor. The firm chooses the feasible production point that will maximize the owner's satisfaction at the given wage rate. Depending upon his views concerning the function of entrepreneurship, the reader can decide upon the means by which the firm's decision is effected. '" The cross-hatched area within KNM in Figure  4 contains the set of possible solutions to the manager's decision problem. The half-line BS' is parallel to the ray OS. All points along the half-line BS' and, therefore, all points along the segment KM yield a profit level of OB measured in units of the good X. If the firm were to operate anywhere along KM, the owner would consume out of profits at B, his saturation level. Consuming at his bliss point, the owner could be no happier. Consider point R' on the segment KM as a possible production point in a competitive equilibrium. Since all points along KM permit the owner to attain unqualified economic bliss, each such point must maximize the owner's utility at the given wage rate; hence the point R' must. So L * is in the labor demand set at that wage, while X2 is in the product supply set. At the given wage rate, the laborer-manager's demand for the consumption good is X1, while the owner's demand for the consumption good is B. The total demand for the consumption good is B + X1 -B + (X2 -B) = X2, a quantity which has been shown to be in the product supply set. In addition, at the given wage rate, the laborer-manager's labor supply is L*, which is in the labor demand set. Hence all markets are cleared. Furthermore, the laborer-manager's utility is maximized for the given wage rate, while the owner's utility is maximized for the given wage rate and the given technology. All behavioral assumptions are satisfied.20 The given wage rate, the quantity of labor at L*, and the consumption allocation of B to the owner and of Xi to the laborer-manager define a market equilibrium in the private ownership economy."2 Suppose, for example, that a government were to nationalize the firm. The government then could supply the former owner with his bliss consumption bundle on the condition that he continue to make any entrepreneurial decisions that he may have made as owner but with the explicit requirement that profits be maximized. Leaving the wage rate unchanged, the government could set the production level at X3 and provide the laborer with a lump-sum bonus equal to X3 -X2. The owner is as blissfully happy as before, while the laborermanager is happier than ever. The new solution being Pareto superior to the old solution, the market equilibrium is not Pareto optimal.22 Furthermore, the externally controlled equilibrium, unlike the market equilibrium, 23 maximizes the firm's and thereby the economy's profits. This example indicates that profits need not be maximized in a competitive equilibrium. Since that result may seem surprising, the applicability of the usual arguments for profit maximization will be considered.
In Gerard Debreu's highly explicit set-theoretic models, the transfer of ownership claims is not possible. Although not always as evident, this characteristic is common to set-theoretic models in general, as has been made clear by Tjalling Koopmans: "A model that assigns specific production sets exhibiting decreasing returns to scale to a given number of producers is suitable only for tracing the effects of a given distribution of nontransferable knowledge and of implied indivisible resources. It cannot serve for discussing the best utilization of all available knowledge and resources when there are no impediments to their diffusion or transfer of control."24 Since for theoretical as well as empirical reasons decreasing returns to scale generally are believed to be a common characteristic of production functions, Koopmans's observation is highly relevant and will be central to much of the following discussion.
In the market solution illustrated in Figure 4 , one might presume that by purchasing the firm the laborer-manager could improve his lot. Since such ownership transfers are not permitted within settheoretic models, the possibility need not be considered. However, in this case the limitations of the set-theoretic method are not serious; since the owner can achieve no higher satisfaction than that which already is available to him, the laborer can offer nothing that would ensure the acceptance of an offer. The continued ownership of the firm by the original owner defines a legitimate stationary allocation of ownership claims.
As described by Koopmans, the number of firms is fixed in set-theoretic models. Hence in Figure 4 no consideration need be given to the possibility of the laborer-manager's building a new firm even if he possessed the necessary wealth. This limitation of settheoretic models need not overly restrict the applicability of Figure  4 . Perhaps the single owner monopolizes required entrepreneurial ability; perhaps he owns the total supply of some scarce factor required in the production of the one good; or perhaps he has acquired a patent on the product.
A common argument in favor of the profit maximization assumption is that firms which do not maximize profits will fail through the competition of more efficient firms. Since in Figure 4 all profits are imputed as rent to the scarce factors monopolized by the firm's owner, those factors are underpaid by the inefficient operation of the firm. No other firm being able to purchase the monopolized factors, no other firm could benefit from their underpayment. Furthermore, all economic rent having been imputed to the scarce factors, no profits remain to serve as an incentive to entry through the use of other nonmonopolized factors. In any event, the basic set-theoretic assumption of a fixed number of firms excludes the possibility of entry by any means.
But suppose that in the unregulated market economy the laborermanager were to attempt to reap the benefits of the controlled equilibrium by setting the firm's output at X3 rather than X2. The added output would accrue as profits to the owner, who would dispose of them. Without access to governmental authority, the laborer-manager would have no means of acquiring the added production from the satiated owner; as a result he would not be motivated to prefer production at N to production at R'.
As indicated in the previous section, Arrow's assumption of the equality of the value of goods supplied and of those consumed should be dropped from the definition of equilibrium. This section indicates that the assumption of profit maximization also might be dropped from that definition. 25 Although the elimination of profit maximization would add realism to the definition of equilibrium, no fundamental error would result if profit maximization were retained, since profits in excess of those desired would not be consumed.
Applications
As noted earlier, Galbraith as well as old and new left economists have dealt with applications for which this article provides a theory; a further application discussed by Joseph Schumpeter will be considered below. Common to all of these views is the conviction that satiation is an affluent society problem. As will be made clear in this section, satiation has its most unfavorable effects on the operation of a private ownership economy when the distribution of wealth is severely unequal, a possibility which can exist in the most nonaffluent societies of the Third World as well as in the most superaffluent societies of the future.
In previous sections, the discussion has been strictly formal to permit adherence to the assumptions of Arrow's model and to provide an extension of Gale's example sufficient to demonstrate the relation of satiation to theoretical welfare economics. No market imperfections were assumed. To construct the desired counter-examples, no uniqueness proof was required, and no uniqueness claim was made; however, in some of the widely known applications of the satiability concept, deviations from a perfect market assumption could be viewed as implicit, since uniqueness is commonly suggested.
The crucial assumption in any attempt to discriminate between nonunique equilibria in an economy containing satiated consumers is the traditional one of selfish preferences. According to that perfect market assumption, a consumer's preferences are related solely to his own consumption; he is not influenced in any way by the consumption bundles attained or desired by any other consumer. Alternatively, if consumers were insatiably charitable, otherwise satiated consumers willingly would donate excess goods to any persons not yet satiated. Deviations from selfishness in the opposite direction can be achieved by permitting envy, the assumption of relative wants. With respect to moderate wealth transfers, charitableness may well be a plausible assumption,26 even within a competitive economy; but with respect to the massive voluntary shifts in wealth and social class that would be required to eliminate economic waste in most common applications of satiability, envy is a far more reasonable one. The assumption of envy in such a model could be viewed as permitting insatiability in status and prestige concomitant with satiability in goods and services. 27 
Economic Development
In a tradition-bound society where the rich are very rich and the poor are very poor, where the name Calvin is unknown,28 where the fixed factor land is held in few hands, and where education is the prerogative of the few, perhaps entrepreneurs may be more interested in protecting their privileged positions than in promoting initiative in peasant-farmers or in employees. In such a society one might expect to find huge bureaucracies in which the buck is always passed and no one rocks the boat. Firmly entrenched in the upper class, the nation's wealth owners perceive the existence of no higher social status to which to aspire and allow "savings by default" in such forms as hoards of jewels and gold to accumulate without limit. 29 In an economy having a high pure interest rate, the consistent channeling of savings away from high yield, low risk assets is evidence that the utility maximization of investors is not representable by a profit maximization process.30 Whatever physical capital might be brought into the economy through investment by foreigners is not of basic value in solving the country's development problems; such capital is mobile and could have been purchased by the country itself if its resource owners possessed the necessary motivation to invest their hoards of savings by default in imported capital goods. The scarcity of the mobile factor capital is a symptom of the country's problem. The cause is the inefficient use of the nation's closely held entrepreneurial ability, land, patents, and other fixed factors.
The Future
In his Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Schumpeter expressed a once fashionable concern about the effect of future affluence upon the "typically bourgeois kind of profit motive" and thereby upon "the efficiency of the capitalist engine of production." 31 He predicted that the entrepreneur eventually would discover that his aspirations, both social and economic, had been satisfied, and that his support for the capitalist order had begun to wane. With his children not sharing their predecessors' entrepreneurial drive toward continued economic accumulation and acquisition, economic stagnation would be followed by a weakly opposed conversion to socialism. Figure 4 provides an illustration of the pretransition stage, in which the inherited income of a nonmaterialistic entrepreneur is in stationary stagnation at a saturation level, his savings are zero, and economic efficiency is low. The incentive for the change to socialism emanates from the preferences of the laborer-manager, while the entrepreneur, to be supported at a saturation level after the transition, offers no resistance to the conversion: Envy is not assumed.
Conclusion
The assumption relaxed by this article is insatiability. The relation between that assumption and those of profit maximization and market clearing has been considered. Through extensions of Gale's simple example, the analysis demonstrates that competitive equilibria in a private ownership economy need not be Pareto optimal. 32 The possibility of the existence of non-Pareto optimal equilibria in an unregulated laissez-faire economy stems from the society's inherently rigid allocation of its wealth. In reaching this conclusion, the paper's methods of analysis, criteria of optimality, and paradigmatic framework of discussion are in all instances those reflecting most favorably upon the performance of a private ownership economy: No market imperfections are assumed. Figure 2 , the strong form of Walras's Law also holds, if demand is interpreted to be market demand rather than consumption. That result follows, since all markets have been shown to be cleared; hence the value of excess supply in each individual market is zero. 17. Although more difficult to illustrate, the conclusion is unchanged when initial stocks of the consumer good are assumed to exist. 18. For the purist who might wish to deal with preferences having "nicer"
properties, a conventional bliss point could be used. The rest of the argument would be the same, since in each case discussed below the owner will choose his bliss consumption bundle. 19. Although the details of management procedures are not relevant to economic theory, one conclusion about administrative policy is dictated by the theory of the firm in Figure 4 , which results from the model's behavioral assumptions. Any managerial system that would generate just-satiating profits is equally in agreement with the model's assumptions as one that generates supersatiating profits; if acquired, excess profits could be discarded by the owner at no cost. Since the owner will be at bliss in either case, his employee could own nothing of any value to his employer. Hence the employee could have no means to influence the owner to provide (or not to provide) rewards or incentives for profits in excess of satiation. 20. As discussed below, if profit maximization were assumed, essentially the same result would obtain following the owner's disposal of unwanted goods. 21. One might expect that the existence of inefficiency in equilibrium reflects an excess supply of some factor in terms of real efficient units rather than nominal units. Here one finds an illustration in the factor market of a phenomenon previously related solely to the market for consumption goods. With labor in Figure 4 measured in efficient units, the market for labor is cleared. The satiation of the owner permits the inefficient use within his firm of those units over which he has purchased control at the market. The market system is unaware of the firm's internal "excess supply" of labor. Also observe that the internal inefficient use of labor need not imply its overpayment relative to the disutility of work. The unpleasantness of repetitive, misdirected, or useless work can be at least as great as that of fully productive labor. In applications, consideration of the internal underutilization of capital is more revealing than that of labor. Again the market remains cleared, with zero capital supplied at the market at all capital prices. 22. It also can be shown that one market equilibrium can be Pareto superior to another: Choices between some equilibria can be made through the utilization of the Pareto optimality criterion. For example, market equilibria Pareto superior to the allocation under consideration could be illustrated by raising the wage rate in Figure 4 . As in the pure exchange example, the point is that the efficient allocation, far from being unique, is one among an uncountable number of inefficient equilibria, between which the model can discriminate only if deviations from some assumptions are permitted. 23. The term market equilibrium will be used solely with respect to a private 
